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The Japanese antidumping law neither works nor is
it practiced. Until very recently, it has been a case of managed econ-
omy, with extensive government-business interaction obviating the
need to use antidumping laws. While some legislation has been on
the books, there's never been an action filed under the available legal
framework for antidumping actions.
There are a number of pieces of Japanese legislation, all more than
twenty-five years old, which provide a framework for'dumping ac-
tions. Japan has an antimonopoly law called the Act for Prohibiting
Private Monopolies and for Securing Fair Trade.' This law was en-
acted during the occupation period in 1947, and it bears-as one
might expect during the American occupation-considerable Ameri-
can influence. It stipulates dumping as a type of unfair trade prac-
tice, and states that it involves selling at unfairly low prices. This
section of the law is quite symmetrical-it also treats selling at un-
fairly high prices as an unfair trade practice. In this particular stat-
ute no distinction is made on the basis of the domestic or foreign
origin of the product. Nonetheless, many Japanese legal commentar-
ies on this unused piece of legislation contend that it is meant to
apply to dumping behavior by foreign producers. We don't really
know because there has never been any action under the Act.
The law charges Japan's Fair Trade Commission, which is its gov-
ernmental antimonopoly body, with administering this law. In 1953,
the Commission acknowledged that unfair prices are prices which
diverge from costs plus normal profits. It then observed, however,
that such prices are not necessarily illegal under antitrust law. Only
if such prices are injurious to Japanese welfare are they considered
disruptive and is action deemed necessary. The Commission has not
really defined what is meant by "injurious" or "disruptive"; rather
they give one example of what would be injurious and disruptive:-
that is, regional price discrimination.
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There is a second piece of Japanese legislation which is part of the
legal framework within which dumping actions might be initiated,
the Export-Import Trade Act, enacted in 1953.2 Article 30 of this Act
grants Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry full
power to intervene in the case of disruptive imports by setting both
prices and quantities of these imports. Again, "disruptive imports"
are not defined. This particular Act has never been used in connec-
tion with dumping, however, there have been many other actions
taken under this piece of legislation, and this is a major reason why
no specific antidumping actions have ever been initiated in Japan.
The third and probably most relevant piece of legislation is Japan's
Tariff Rate Act. 3 This Act is quite old; indeed, many sections of it go
back to the very early decades of the twentieth century. It specifi-
cally enables the Japanese government to impose offsetting duties
when imports are coming in at less than fair price. They're allowed
to do this in a case where there is damage to existing industries, and,
interestingly enough, in a case where such imports constitute an
obstacle toward the establishment of a new industry. There is a de-
velopmental character to the law, and if import prices are such that
they prevent the establishment of an industry, it would appear that
action could be taken. Under the United States antidumping law,
once dumping is found to have occurred, the duties imposed on the
importer are equal to the difference between the imported price and
the home market price. But under the Japanese Act, once dumping is
found, the duties imposed are equal to the difference between the
imported price and what is considered to be the fair price. This same
Act allows for an industry petition and industry submission of evi-
dence, and for independent government action. The Act also provides
for temporary penalties after the petition has been accepted; if the
petition is accepted, the temporary penalties are imposed while the
government carries on its investigation. These temporary penalties
or duties are limited to a period of six months. And then (as must be
common with legislation in all countries), if it is found that there is
no dumping, the money collected as a temporary penalty is returned.
If the government does decide, as a result of its investigation, that
dumping has actually taken place, the Act provides that the Japa-
nese tariff can be permanently increased. Where dumping occurs for
a product which has been subject to a tariff reduction under a GA'T
agreement, this piece of Japanese legislation provides that Japan
should withdraw this product from the agreement. There are quite a
few other provisions of this Act which go into how investigations
should proceed.
The discussion of these three Acts is, of course, all quite theoreti-
cal. In common with many of the statutes all over the world, they're
rather sketchy. These three pieces of legislation haven't been fleshed
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out at all by actual practice or litigation. The reasons that no dump-
ing actions have ever been initiated in Japan are really not very
surprising. Dumping only occurs in markets which are open; if a
market is protected only by a nonprohibitive tariff, you will get
dumping actions. In Japan, until the early 1970s, for most purposes
there were no markets in any product line where there was anything
like competition between imports and domestically produced prod-
ucts. Since the early 1970s competition has produced some uncom-
fortable moments for quite a few Japanese industries, but Japan has
until very recently not responded. Japan is in so many instances a
target of dumping actions taken by other countries, so for Japan to
initiate dumping actions of its own might seem a bit impolitic, and
might seem to legitimate the aggressive use of such statutes by
others. For example, in 1975 and 1976 when Japanese silk producers
were suffering very greatly from competition by Korean and Chinese
imports, the Japanese response was really quite different. They nego-
tiated an orderly market agreement, used special government pur-
chasing agencies to deal with the problem, and made no reference to
any of the antidumping statutes. That was in 1975 and 1976. In
1977, for the very first time, producers of chemical fertilizers in Ja-
pan drew up a petition-or began to draw up a petition-against
cheap American imports and presented this petition to the Japanese
government, but the government did not act on it and discouraged
the Japanese producers from pursuing it. Significantly, even as this
was being done, American exporters raised their prices, so it did
have some impact. Thus, there was a reaction on the part of the
offending party.
This year, also for the first time, Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry will actually carry out its first two investigations
under the provisions of the Tariff Rate Act. The first investigation
will be against ferro-chrome products from South Africa, Sweden
and Brazil. There are five Japanese ferro-chrome producers which
are now preparing a petition. The Ministry of International Trade
and Industry has not discouraged this petition, as happened in the
case of chemical fertilizers; and since the European Community and
the United States have acted on this product line they probably felt
uncomfortable about dismissing out of hand the claims of the Japa-
nese companies. In all likelihood there may be another investigation
against Taiwanese and possibly also against American producers of
acrylic staple fibers.
As the modes of operation of the Japanese economy continue to
more closely resemble those of other advanced industrialized coun-
tries, and resemble less a managed economy, there will be increased
use of antidumping statutes. Even though the legislation under
which many of these actions will be taken bears something of an
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American imprint, the procedures will probably reflect more the Eu-
ropean flavor of negotiated settlements than the American legalistic
practice.
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